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I. APPELLEES' CONTRADICTIONS OF AND DISCREPANCIES IN 
THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE RECORD ARE IRRELEVANT 
FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL. 
A. Utah County Appellees. 
In ruling on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and 
consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Whipple v. American Fork 
Irrigation Company, 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996). 
Appellees, Deputy Morgan and Utah County (hereinafter "Utah County 
Appellees"), misstate facts as set forth in the record. Utah County Appellees state 
in their brief that "hostilities developed between the Pintars and the Houcks, 
prompting Mrs. Houck to call the Sheriffs Department to complain about Mr. 
Pintar's verbal and demonstrative hostilities toward them." Utah County Apllees.' 
Brief p. 3. However, Appellants plead in their Complaint that there was great 
hostility exhibited by the Houcks toward the Pintars, not that there were hostilities 
between the parties. R. 3. This hostility included the Houcks contacting the Utah 
County Sheriffs Department at least six (6) times regarding the Pintars. R. 819-
22, 855-56, 863-65, 1071-74, 1096-1115, 1130. Also, Utah County Appellees 
state in their brief that: (1) "Deputy Morgan investigated Mrs. Houck's complaints. 
. . ." and (2) "[The Pintars allege] Deputy Morgan failed to properly investigate 
1 
the claims before turning over her report to the Utah County Attorney(s)' Office 
for prosecution." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 3, 23. The record is clear, 
however, that Appellants alleged in their Complaint and argued throughout that 
Deputy Morgan conducted absolutely no investigation in this matter. R. 4, 5, 818, 
854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1292, 1294. Utah 
County Appellees further state that "[T]he Pintars allege in their Complaint that 
because the allegations leading to Mr. Pintar's arrest were false, Deputy Morgan's 
actions were unreasonable." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23. This is also 
incorrect. Appellants alleged that the allegations leading to Mr. Pintar's arrest, 
even if true, did not constitute a crime. R. 5, 829-30, 1292, 1294. 
In misstating the facts, Utah County Appellees attempt to depict the situation 
as a mutually hostile neighbor dispute rather than what the allegations on the 
record clearly show: the only hostility in this situation was that of the Houcks 
toward the Pintars. Utah County Appellees further attempt to skew the record to 
portray Deputy Morgan as well-intentioned, or at worst, negligent in her duties 
(e.g. "she failed to properly investigate"). In fact, Deputy Morgan willfully did not 
investigate the matter. Also, Utah County Appellees misrepresent the allegations 
by stating that Deputy Morgan took a complaint regarding criminal activity 
committed by L. Pintar, who later turned out to be innocent. 
These discrepancies are material and important in that they are factors which 
tend to show concerted effort between the Houcks and Deputy Morgan to have Mr. 
2 
Pintar wrongfully arrested. It is somewhat understandable that reasonable officers 
commit negligence from time to time in the course of an investigation. However, 
it is neither reasonable nor understandable that an arrest takes place without a 
crime being alleged by a complainant and absolutely no investigation by the 
arresting officer. This is especially true in light of the fact that the complaining 
party's close relative worked at the same law enforcement agency as the arresting 
officer, and there was no crime committed, or even alleged. 
Utah County Appellees' version of the allegations is irrelevant. This Court 
is obliged to follow the standard set forth in Whipple, supra at 1219, and accept all 
factual allegations in the Complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to Appellants as the 
moving party in this matter. 
B. Houck Appellees. 
Appellees Martin and Darlene Houck (hereinafter "Houck Appellees) 
dispute the facts plead and attempt to introduce their version of the facts as set 
forth on the record in their Statement of Facts. Houck Apllees.' Brief, pp. 1-6. For 
purposes of this Appeal, this court must consider all facts in the Complaint as true 
and consider them in a light most favorable to Appellants. Whether the Houcks 
dispute those facts is irrelevant to this appeal. 
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II. DEPUTY SUSAN MORGAN WAS A POLICYMAKER FOR UTAH 
COUNTY IN THIS MATTER AND THEREFORE LIABILITY MUST 
ATTACH TO UTAH COUNTY. 
A. The Facts Alleged in the Complaint Show that Officer Morgan is 
a Policymaker for Utah County. 
Utah County Appellees argue that Appellants failed to allege in their original 
Complaint that Utah County has an official policy that led to a violation of Mr. 
Pintar's constitutional rights and that Deputy Morgan acted pursuant to such 
policy. This argument is not well taken. Appellants have plead facts in their 
Complaint from which any reasonable inference therefrom shows that Deputy 
Morgan herself established official Utah County policy which led to the 
unconstitutional arrest of Mr. Pintar (R. 3-6; Apllnts.' Brief pp. 25-26). 
Furthermore, Utah County Appellees do not dispute that: (1) a governmental 
custom or policy may be established by a single policymaker, Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); (2) the identification of officials having "final 
policymaking authority" is a question of state (including local) law, City of St. 
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) citing Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati, supra, at 483; and (3) Utah law gives law enforcement officers the final 
authority to determine what is a lawful arrest. Utah Code Ann. §17-22-2; Utah 
Code Ann. §77-7-2. As the Utah County Appellees correctly point out: 
The fact that a particular official has discretion in the exercise of 
particular functions does not give rise to municipal liability based on 
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an exercise of that discretion unless the official is also responsible, 
under state law, for establishing final governmental policy respecting 
such activity. 
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra at 481-482 [emphasis added]; Utah County 
Apllees.' Brief p. 3. 
As the Utah County Appellees further point out: "Only those municipal officers 
who have final policymaking authority may by their actions subject municipal 
government to §1983 liability." City of St Louis v. Praprotnik, supra, at 123. 
Utah law is clear that police officers have final decision-making authority to 
make arrests. In the State of Utah, an arrest by a law enforcement officer is not the 
municipality or government entity "simply going along with discretionary 
decisions made by subordinates" Id. at 130. The officer's final authority to arrest 
is mandated by state law. The only constraint the law of the State of Utah places 
on law enforcement officers in making an arrest is that that arrest be "lawful." 
Utah Code Ann. §17-22-2. However, the State of Utah is silent as to what 
constitutes a "lawful" arrest for a sheriff to make. It is therefore the duty of the 
officer to determine the policy on behalf of a municipality as to what constitutes a 
"lawful" arrest. 
In the instant case, Utah County's policy, as established by Deputy Morgan, 
was to have Mr. Pintar arrested where there was no allegation of a crime and no 
investigation of the complaints made. Furthermore, Utah County's policy in this 
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matter was to ignore the fact that the complaining witness' close relative worked at 
the same Sheriffs Department as Deputy Morgan—a fact that Deputy Morgan was 
aware of when she responded to this matter. R. 818-19, 834, 854, 862, 929, 1018, 
1294. The policy of Utah County in this matter clearly violated Mr. Pintar's 
Constitutional Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable 
cause. Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Therefore, liability must attach to Utah 
County. 
B. Deputy Morgan's Decision To Arrest Mr. Pintar And Initiate 
Criminal Proceedings Against Him Was Not Reviewable Nor 
Constrained By Any Other Policies. 
Utah County Appellees concede that the law does not provide a review of a 
police officer's decision to arrest prior to the arrest. Utah County Appellees argue 
instead that because the law provides a review of actions after the fact, the officer's 
decision is reviewable by others rendering the officer less than a final policymaker 
pursuant to Milligan-Hitt v. Board of Trustees of Sheridan County School District 
No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998). This argument is flawed on two grounds: 
(1) there was no review of an arrest that took place after the arrest, and even if 
there were, (2) the Milligan-Hitt ruling does not consider a situation where the 
review takes place after the fact. Id. at 1229-1230. 
First, Utah County Appellees do not offer that there was any type of review 
of Mr. Pintar's arrest. Instead, Utah County Appellees argue that because the Utah 
County Attorney's Office continued with the criminal prosecution of the matter, it 
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constituted a "review" of the arrest. Utah law specifically enumerates the duties of 
County Attorneys in Utah Code Ann. §17-18-1.5 and Utah Code Ann. §17-18-1.7. 
There is nothing contained in these statutes or any other Utah statute which 
authorizes or directs a County Attorney to make an arrest, or to review the 
propriety of an arrest made by a police officer. The County Attorney's duty is to 
file charges and prosecute crimes based on the allegations presented to him or her. 
The County Attorney cannot "undo" an arrest after the fact. County Attorneys 
have no authority to do so under Utah law. 
In the instant case, if the County Attorney declined to prosecute Mr. Pintar 
immediately after the arrest, the arrest would still have taken place, and Mr. 
Pintar5 s constitutional rights would still have been abridged. Following Utah 
County Appellees9 logic to its natural conclusion, any police officer can arrest 
anyone, with or without probable cause, for any reason (such as doing a favor for a 
friend, or based on race, gender, nationality, etc.) with no liability attaching to a 
municipality because the County Attorney may or may not prosecute the matter. 
Similarly, a municipality could simply institute a policy of "reviews" every 10 
years. If this court adopts Utah County Appellees' argument that it does not matter 
when a review takes place, this would completely obviate any liability to a 
municipality for the deprivation of constitutional rights incident to a wrongful 
arrest. 
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Second, the facts of Milligan-Hitt, supra, present a case in which the review 
of an official's decision is conducted prior to any action being taken. As set forth 
Appellant's Brief, the Milligan-Hitt Court adjudicated a case in which a Wyoming 
School teacher brought an action against a school district and superintendent 
alleging she was not hired based on her sexual orientation. In determining whether 
the superintendent was a policymaker for the school district the Court looked to the 
local policy of the school district which expressly provided that the 
superintendent's decisions are to be constrained by the general policies enacted by 
the school board. Apllnts.' Brief, pp. 24-25. Secondly, the Court held: 
. . . . under the board's policies at issue in this case, the 
superintendent's hiring decisions are reviewable by others. . . . When 
a superintendent puts forward the candidates recommended by the 
committee, the board may decide not to hire them. If the board does 
not like the candidates the superintendent puts forward, it may 
demand new ones. This review prevents the superintendent from 
being a final policymaker. 
Id at 1229-1230. 
In other words, in pursuant to the Court's ruling in Milligan-Hitt, supra, the 
official's decision whether or not to hire someone is reviewable before the hiring is 
made. This is distinguishable from the instant case, where, assuming arguendo 
that the County Attorney(s)' prosecution constituted a review, a decision either 
way occurs after the arrest has already occurred. 
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Moreover, Utah County Appellees argue that Appellants' attempt to 
distinguish "decision" from "action" where no distinction is made by the Milligan-
Hitt Court. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 16-17. This is misconstruing the 
precise fact pattern of the Milligan-Hitt case, which was: (1) decision, followed by 
(2) review, followed by (3) action. In the instant case, Deputy Morgan proceeded 
as follows: (1) decision, followed by (2) action, followed by (3) review (assuming 
the County Attorney(s)' prosecution constituted a "review"). 
C, Holding Utah County Liable In This Case Does Not Create 
Municipal Liability On The Basis Of Respondeat Superior. 
Lastly, Utah County Appellees argue that holding Utah County liable in the 
instant case for its unconstitutional policies as set forth by Deputy Morgan would 
"lead to the absurd result that all discretionary actions by police officers could be 
considered the creation of municipal policy, and therefore create municipal liability 
on the basis of respondeat superior." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 12-13. This 
is an overbroad and vague public policy argument which could just as easily be 
countered with: "Not holding Utah County liable would lead to the absurd result 
that police officers could arrest anyone at any given time for no particular reason 
and there would be no legal recourse for that individual." 
In ruling on municipal liability regarding Section 1983 claims, the United 
States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Court's duty is to determine where 
the responsibility lies. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra, at 478-479. If an 
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official or municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional 
deprivation, then the municipality is liable. Id. A single individual may be a 
policymaker for the entire municipality. Id. at 480. Whether a single individual is 
a policymaker for the entire municipality is a question of state law. City of St. 
Louis v. Praprotnik, supra at 124. 
In the instant case, Deputy Morgan promulgated Utah County policy by 
arresting Mr. Pintar in the absence of probable cause, the absence of an 
investigation, and the absence of the allegation of a crime. This does not mean that 
every action of every police officer would lead to municipal liability. Each case is 
fact-specific. The relevant inquiries must be made. Was there in fact a 
constitutional violation? Was the officer's decisions reviewable by others prior to 
the constitutional violation? Does state (or local) law confer upon the officer the 
authority to act as a policymaker for the municipality? If the answers are such that 
an officer is a policymaker and the policy he or she makes on behalf of the 
municipality leads to a deprivation of constitutional rights, then the Supreme Court 
has held that the municipality must be liable. Thus, as the answers to these 
inquiries differ, the outcomes will differ as well. 
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III. DEPUTY SUSAN MORGAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY FROM MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND 
CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTION 1983. 
Utah County Appellees state that Appellants do not offer any argument 
concerning the dismissal of the conspiracy cause of action pursuant to Section 
1983. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 10. This is incorrect. The district court's 
decision is silent on whether Appellants met the applicable test to establish a 
conspiracy cause of action, and the district court ends its inquiry by finding that 
Deputy Morgan enjoys qualified immunity from both malicious prosecution and 
conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983. R. 205-209. Therefore, it must be concluded 
that the district court felt that whether Appellants met the test for conspiracy was 
irrelevant in light of Deputy Morgan's qualified immunity. Appellants' brief 
therefore responded to the district court's decision that Deputy Morgan had 
qualified immunity for both malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. 
A. The Facts Plead In The Complaint Clearly Show That Deputy 
Morgan Is Not Entitled To Qualified Immunity. 
Utah County Appellees do not dispute that the district court abused its 
discretion in ignoring or misinterpreting facts presented in the Complaint and 
further does not dispute that those discrepancies are material in determining 
whether qualified immunity should be conferred upon Deputy Morgan. Instead, 
Utah County Appellees once again misconstrue the facts plead by Appellants in 
stating that Appellants "entire argument is based on the theory that the facts 
11 
alleged in the Complaint do not constitute probable cause for disorderly conduct. 
. ." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 21. This is incorrect in two ways. First, 
Appellants alleged in their Complaint, that even if the allegations against Mr. 
Pintar were true, they did not constitute a crime. R. 5, 829-30, 1292, 1294. 
Second, Appellants base their argument on the totality of circumstances alleged in 
the Complaint, including: (1) Deputy Morgan verbally threatened the Pintars with 
criminal sanctions without probable cause or authority; (2) Deputy Morgan did not 
even undertake a rudimentary investigation of the matter to determine if there was 
any criminal act by Lewis J. Pintar; (3) Deputy Morgan did not have any contact 
with Lewis J. Pintar before filing a police report which caused him to be arrested, 
(4) a close relative of the complaining witnesses worked at the same law 
enforcement agency as Officer Morgan, and (5) the underlying conduct as alleged, 
even if true, does not constitute a crime. R. 3-6, 143; Apllnts.' Brief pp. 28. 
Utah County Appellees argue that ". . . .the Pintars ignore the fact that the 
district court never made a finding that the Pintars' facts did or did not constitute 
disorderly conduct." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 21. In point of fact, the 
district court ignored the allegation made by Appellants altogether. It was 
explicitly alleged as a matter of fact in the Complaint that the allegations against 
Mr. Pintar, even if taken as true, did not constitute a crime under Utah law. The 
district court had no latitude to make a finding regarding the allegation. The 
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district court was compelled to accept the allegations of the Complaint as true. 
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Company, supra at 1219. 
Furthermore, Utah County Appellees argue that the district court never ruled 
on whether the facts constituted probable cause and instead focused on the "bigger 
picture." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 21. The district court does not have this 
discretion. Whether or not the facts alleged in the Complaint show an arrest 
without probable cause—a violation of a clearly established constitutional right— 
goes directly to the heart of the matter. The law is clear: where an official 
deprives a constitutional right and that right was clearly established at the time of 
deprivation such that a reasonable official would understand that his or her conduct 
was unlawful, he or she does not enjoy qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194(2001). 
Finally, Utah County Appellants allege that Deputy Morgan acted as a 
reasonable officer. Utah County Appellees argue that "The Pintars. . . . [alleged] 
Deputy Morgan failed to properly investigate the claims before turning over her 
report to the Utah County Attorney's Office." Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23. 
This is not true. As set forth, supra, Appellants alleged that there was absolutely 
no investigation that took place. R. 4, 5, 818, 854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980, 
983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1292, 1294. "Failing to properly investigate" implies that 
Officer Morgan attempted to investigate the matter, however negligently. Where 
absolutely no investigation was undertaken by Deputy Morgan, it was clearly an 
13 
intentional decision. This is unreasonable. Utah County Appellees further argue 
that "The Pintars allege in their Complaint that because the allegations leading to 
Mr. Pintar9s arrest were false, Deputy Morgan's actions were unreasonable. This 
is also not true. As set forth, supra, the Pintars alleged that even if the allegations 
were true against Mr. Pintar, they did not constitute a crime R. 5, 829-30, 1292, 
1294. Utah County Appellees' version of the allegations implies that Deputy 
Morgan reasonably relied on the Houcks' allegations in arresting Mr. Pintar. 
However, the Houcks' initial allegations do not support the conclusion that Deputy 
Morgan acted reasonably in arresting L. Pintar. Simply put, the Houcks failed to 
allege a crime. Would a reasonable officer arrest an individual for eating chocolate 
ice cream? Or wearing a shirt with the wrong color? Just as these types of actions 
constitute non-criminal activity, so do the allegations made by the Houcks that led 
to the arrest of Mr. Pintar. 
The other facts alleged in the Complaint further evince that Deputy 
Morgan's actions were unreasonable: (1) the complaining witnesses' close relative 
worked at the same sheriffs department, (2) Deputy Morgan knew of this fact 
when she did not investigate this matter and arrested Mr. Pintar without the 
allegation of a crime, and (3) Deputy Morgan chose not to contact Mr. Pintar at all 
in this matter before having him arrested. R. 3-6. Apllnts.' Brief, pp. 25-26. 
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B. The Actions Of The County Attorney(s) Do Not Confer Qualified 
Immunity Upon Deputy Morgan Nor Do They Relieve Her Of 
Liability. 
Appellees, Martin and Darlene Houck argue that they are not responsible for 
Deputy Morgan's decision to arrest Mr. Pintar and initiate criminal proceedings. 
They merely made the complaint. R. 638-639, 1208, Houck Apllees.' Brief, pp. 
34. Deputy Morgan argues that it is not her fault that the allegations made by the 
Houcks later turned out to be false. R. 77-78, Utah County Apllees.5 Brief pp. 23-
24. Deputy Morgan merely relied on what the Houcks said. Deputy Morgan 
further argues that she is not responsible for the County Attorney(s)' decision to 
prosecute the matter after Mr. Pintar was arrested. She merely turned the matter 
over to the County Attomey(s). Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23-24. 
Furthermore, Deputy Morgan argues that, since she is not responsible for the 
actions of the County Attorney(s) in this matter, she is entitled to qualified 
immunity. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 23-24. While it is true that Deputy 
Morgan is not responsible for the actions or inactions of the County Attomey(s) 
during the criminal prosecution, the actions or inactions of the County Attorney(s) 
are irrelevant. It was Deputy Morgan's decision, and hers alone, to arrest Mr. 
Pintar and initiate the criminal proceedings. The subsequent actions taken by the 
County Attorney(s) do not absolve Deputy Morgan of responsibility for her 
actions. 
15 
The courts have used the common law of torts as a "starting point" for 
determining the contours of constitutional violations under Section 1983. Pierce v. 
Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004). The Restatement of Torts, 2d, 
states that malicious prosecution occurs when one (a) initiates or procures the 
proceedings without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of 
bringing an offender to justice, and (b) the proceedings have terminated in favor of 
the accused. Restatement of Torts, 2d, §§653, 674 (1977). Pursuant to the 
common law definition, simply initiating the criminal proceedings and having Mr. 
Pintar arrested by itself subjects Deputy Morgan to liability under Section 1983. 
This argument is buttressed by the fact that Deputy Morgan took these actions after 
conducting absolutely no investigation, in the absence of the allegation of crime, 
and with the knowledge that the complaining witnesses' close relative worked at 
the same sheriffs department. Utah law is also clear that merely initiating or 
instituting criminal proceedings and causing the arrest of an individual render one 
liable for malicious prosecution where the other elements of the tort have been 
met. Kool v. Lee, 134 P. 906, 910 (1913). 
C. The Facts As Plead In The Complaint Are Sufficient To Sustain A 
Cause Of Action For Conspiracy Pursuant To Section 1983, 
Although the subheading of Utah County Appellees' argument states that 
Deputy Morgan is entitled to qualified immunity from conspiracy pursuant to 
Section 1983, Utah County Appellees' argument instead addresses whether or not 
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Appellants met the elements of conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983 in the 
allegations of their Complaint. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 24-27. As set 
forth supra, the district court did not address whether Appellants met the elements 
of conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983. For this reason, the elements of 
conspiracy are not at issue here. 
Even assuming the elements of conspiracy were at issue in this Appeal, 
Appellants sufficiently plead those elements. Utah County Appellees argue that 
Appellants present nothing more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy, which 
is insufficient. Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504 (10th Cir. 
1998). In Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, the court held that a law school 
professor alleged a conspiracy against him by the faculty because the faculty 
discussed action against him following allegations of his improper conduct with a 
student. The court held that the plaintiff provided only conclusory and 
unsubstantiated allegations of a conspiracy based solely on the fact that the 
governmental entities discussed the actions that were ultimately taken against 
Plaintiff. Id. at 533. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of 
Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents. 
Utah County Appellees argue that the conspiracy allegation only concerns 
Tonya Houck, the daughter-in-law of the complaining witnesses, Martin and 
Darlene Houck, who is employed at the Utah County Sheriffs Department. Utah 
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County Apllees.' Brief pp. 26. Utah County Appellees further misstate 
Appellants' allegations that the conspiracy is based solely on the following facts: 
(1) Ms. [Tonya] Houck is employed as a secretary in the Judicial Services Division 
of the Utah County Sheriffs Office; (2) Ms. [Tonya] Houck happens to be the 
daughter-in-law of codefendants, Darlene and Martin Houck; and (3) Ms. Houck 
has an alleged friendship with Deputy Morgan. Utah County Apllees.5 Brief pp. 
26. Utah County Appellees further argue that even if these allegations were true, 
they present nothing more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy which is 
insufficient. Utah County Apllees.' Brief pp. 27. 
However, the allegation that Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan have a 
personal and friendly relationship is not, nor ever has been, the lynchpin of 
Appellants' cause of action for conspiracy. Appellants specifically plead in their 
Complaint that: (1) the complaining witnesses, Martin and Darlene Houck, had a 
close relative who worked at the same Utah County Sheriffs Office they called to 
complain regarding L. Pintar; (2) the responding officer, Deputy Morgan, knew of 
this fact when she responded to the call; (3) the Houcks and Deputy Morgan, 
worked in concert to have L. Pintar arrested by: 
(a) Deputy Morgan verbally threatening criminal action against L. Pintar 
to his wife when he was not present, despite the fact that he was not present at the 
verbal altercation between Martin Houck and Nicholas Pintar the date of the 
Complaint; R. 3-6, 808. 
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(b) Deputy Morgan failing to document in writing the fact that she went 
to the Pintars' residence and verbally threatened criminal action against Mr. Pintar 
to his wife. R. 3. 
(c) Deputy Morgan failing to conduct any investigation of the matter 
before having L. Pintar arrested, booked, fingerprinted, and having his mug shot 
placed on the internet; R. 4, 5, 818, 854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985, 
987,992,1135,1292,1294. 
(d) Deputy Morgan mandating L. Pintar's arrest even in the absence of an 
allegation of a crime. R. 5, 829-30, 1292, 1294. 
Most importantly, the allegations of the Complaint lead to the reasonable 
conclusion that the above actions were done in concert as a result of an agreement, 
either express or tacit, between Deputy Morgan, Martin Houck and Darlene 
Houck. R. 5. Plaintiffs must only allege and show "facts tending to show an 
agreement and concerted action." Beedles v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th 
Cir. 2005). Although a conspiracy may be established by either direct or 
circumstantial evidence, it is usually susceptible of no other proof than that of 
circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of a conspiracy is ordinarily in the 
possession and control of the alleged conspirators and is seldom attainable. 15A 
Corpus Juris Secumdum, Conspiracy §37. 
Utah County Appellees seem to be putting forth a requirement that a 
conspiracy in this matter must include direct involvement of Tonya Houck. 
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However, no such requirement exists. The allegations of the Complaint clearly 
show an agreement and concerted action to deprive L. Pintar of his constitutional 
right to be free from arrest without probable cause between Deputy Morgan, 
Martin Houck and Darlene Houck. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
THE PINTARS LEAVE TO FILE THEIR SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
The Houck Appellees repeat, verbatim, their Opposition to Appellants' 
original motion in district court as well as the district court's ruling. The Houck 
Appellees do not address Appellants' argument that Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, is clear that "leave [to amend a complaint] shall be freely given 
where justice so requires." The Houck Appellees do not address the fact that 
Appellants relied upon and met the agreed upon deadline for the amending of 
pleadings. Further, the Houck Appellees do not address to the fact that they had an 
opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the allegations of the proposed Second 
Amended Complaint and indeed propounded discovery questions which dealt 
solely with those allegations, thus obviating any claim that they would be 
prejudiced by the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS' 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AS TO 
THE HOUCKS. 
Rather than directly addressing Appellants' arguments regarding the First 
Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief, the Houck Appellees simply repeat from 
other briefs and rulings on file in this matter regarding the First Cause of Action 
for Declaratory Relief. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS' 
SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, CIVIL CONSPIRACY PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 1983 AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY AS TO THE 
HOUCKS. 
The Houck Appellees again almost exclusively repeat from other briefs and 
rulings on file in this matter regarding the Second, Third, and Fourth causes of 
action for Malicious Prosecution, Civil Conspiracy, and Conspiracy Pursuant to 
Section 1983, respectively. The Houcks do not present any new arguments or 
authority. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully ask that in ruling on the district court's dismissal of 
this matter, this Court bear in mind that an individual was arrested by the police 
based on allegations by his neighbors where: (1) there was a history of great 
hostility shown by the neighbors toward that individual; (2) the neighbor's close 
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relative works at the same law enforcement agency as the arresting officer—a fact 
which the officer knew; (3) there was absolutely no investigation of the matter by 
the arresting officer; and (4) the allegations of the neighbor, even if true, did not 
constitute a crime. 
In order to uphold one or all of the district court's respective rulings, this 
Court must determine whether such an arrest can happen without assigning any 
responsibility to Utah County, Deputy Morgan, Martin Houck, and/or Darlene 
Houck. Appellants respectfully submit that, based on the facts of this case and the 
applicable law, it is impossible to do so and affirm the district court's rulings. 
Based on the foregoing and those reasons set forth in Appellants' Brief, 
Appellants respectfully request that this court reverse and remand the case to the 
district court. 
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DATED this2Qday of December, 2010 
Law Offices of Jason L. Pintar, 
o^ , J ^ ^ I A O ^ V 
Jason L. Pintar, 
Attorney for the Pintars 
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